The object of this article is to explore a familiar paradox of folklore studies: the promotion of powerfully localist readings in the service of an inclusive national entity. In the logic of European nationalism, this might seem an irresolvable paradox. The object of the nation-state is to unify all potentially divergent cultural and social entities within a single framework, so that localist sentiment ceases to represent the threat of political separatism. In some nation-states, the most harmonious symbiosis of localism with nationalism appears in those regions that are stereotypically regarded as culturally and politically marginal and are consequently subjected to the double-edged opprobrium of being both "simple" and yet also corrupted by a vast range of allegedly foreign elements both culturally and "racially." A study of these tension-laden matters must dodge among several levels in order to go beyond the limitations both of purely local ethnography and of national-level historiography. If the former too easily occludes the effects of larger events on local perceptions, the latter can, and often does, fail to account for the success of nationalist ideologies in securing loyalty unto death even-or perhaps especially?-from populations that are notoriously unwilling to accept state rule in more mundane matters of law and order.
the "Turkish Cretans" of being "Turkish seed" (Tourkospori), has itself been viewed by many Mainland Greeks as a hopelessly mixed and tainted population. Athenians, for example, are often quick to condemn what they see as an endemic Cretan proclivity for violence, and attribute it to the island's long occupation by the Ottoman Empire; this is a very effective way of both sympathizing nationalistically while expressing the strong regional prejudice of which Cretans often complain in Athens. Yet, at the same time, there is a grudging recognition in Mainland Greece that the Cretans were in fact valiant opponents of the Turks and other invaders, a recognition that localist historians and folklorists have generally been quick to exploit as characterological evidence that the Cretans are, in fact, not only pure-blooded and culturally intact Hellenes, but that they are more so than anyone else: "If, however, our Race presents tradition with intensity in all places, a more impressive glory is exhibited in Crete, where it is preserved pure and untainted in the soul, in thought, in speech, in dress, in dance, in song, in the house and in the village throughout the Great Island that is the bearer of fine brave men" (Nikolaos Sp. Voulgaris, in Papadakis 1975:9).
If this may strike some readers as both bombastic and defensive, we would do well to remember again that Cretans do face considerable condescension from other Greeks, notably those of the capital. Indeed, it is often those who attack the Cretans and other "akritic"3 populations as culturally or genetically impure who are simultaneously most adamant in insisting that all non-Greek populations within the national borders should be exterminated or expelled. Official Greek writings, reflected also in popular usage, generally exhibit a unified image of the national culture, and express deep resentment of attempts to specify local or externally derived cultural elements; some Greek commentators have worried, for example, that my own work on Crete might foster an excessive sense of local autonomy, as I was once very secretively informed, or that it would embarrass the nation through revelations of such disreputable practices as animal-theft, or again that these practices might be held to militate against the fundamentally European identity that official ideology claims for the country.4 Thus, a massive homogeneity at the national ideological level co- 4 These are diagnostic examples of the defense of cultural intimacy at the national level; see Herzfeld 1997:98-105. Hints that I was suspected of fomenting separatism reached me while I was conducting fieldwork on Crete; the embarrassment that my lecturing on reciprocal animal-theft in English at an American university caused the Greek students who had invited me to speak (and none of whom hailed from Crete) can usefully be compared to the very positive response I received for a similar lecture given subsequently in Greek, at the Rethemnos (Crete) town hall. (It may also be significant that Cretans were generally less willing to join in the general disparagement of local social practices that some media were pursuing at the time.) Increasingly, however, Greek scholars, aware that the very charge of defensiveness can itself be damaging to the national image, have lately shown signs of much more readily welcoming discussions of potentially embarrassing topics in international public contexts.
exists with fractured localist perceptions that seem to infuse much local writing, including that of the schoolteachers to whom we owe the preservation of much Greek folklore ever since the middle of the last century. Instructions to would-be collectors of folklore, many of whom were again to be schoolteachers working in strategic cooperation with their pupils, specify that the task is part of a "more general National effort" (Stavroulakis 1964 In an extended earlier study of nationalism and folklore in Greece, I attempted an initial account of how Greek folklorists tried to resolve this tension between the goal of a national culture and their pride in local specificity (Herzfeld 1982 ). I argued, in effect, that the coexistence of localism and nationalism revealed the intensely segmentary social logic of the latter: local authors vied to represent their respective homelands (patridhes, a term that is significantly identical with that used of the national state as a whole as well as, at the other end of the spectrum, one's home villages) as the best exemplars of the Classical Greek spirit. Thus, while they were in opposition to each other, they played by a single, unifying set of rules through which they ultimately expressed their collective subordination to the national idea.5 When I wrote that study, there was already a small corpus of research on the links between nationalism and folklore, which emphasized the role of intellectuals in creating a unified corpus (e.g., Oinas 1961; Dorson 1966; Wilson 1976 ). More recent work, some of it conducted in a more ethnographic spirit, has examined the reappropriation of culture for the purposes of local resistance to dominant national agendas (e.g., Badone 1991, on Brittany; Nadel-Klein 1991, on Scotland). One analyst has asked why, even given the obvious differences of language and religion, state-local relations in Switzerland appear remarkably free of any tension at all (Bendix 1992:783) . In recent years, on the other hand, such tensions have arguably become more visible in the European Union's member states, as both historians (e.g., Applegate 1999) and anthropologists (e.g., Macdonald 1996) have noted.
Greece is thus hardly unique in the tension that it exhibits between the national and local levels, and this is reflected in a survey of the folklore literature. On the surface, Italian folklore studies in particular display a similar tension be-tween the emergent and newly created national identity and those of the numerous regional cultures. Yet the resemblance is deceptive, and conceals a fundamentally different relationship between center and periphery in Italy and Greece, respectively. The folklore literature reveals that these two states have drawn on local culture in radically divergent ways, and with equally contrasted effects. Above all, whereas Greece presents to the world a face of passionate national intransigence that sometimes provokes exasperation but that rarely admits of any ambiguity, Italian attempts to resolve the local-national tension do not seem to have enjoyed such political success except, perhaps, on the football field; Italy is today constantly beset by the powerfully centrifugal forces that the country's founders had ruefully acknowledged from the start, with separatist movements commanding significant political impact in several of its culturally and linguistically distinct regions. Even leaving aside the obvious case of the Lega Nord (Northern League), which eventually sacrificed its demands for a completely independent state called Padania with its capital in Venice as the price of entering the ruling government coalition in 2001, Italy also has a capital city regarded as culturally and politically marginal by many citizens, home to a widely-despised local dialect that departs in significant ways from the national linguistic standard. That dialect is now the object of affectionate and energetic revival movements that recognize in it a way of life that meets the major requirement of cultural intimacy: a sense of disrepute in the larger world, creating solidarity at the core of a collective identity. Not coincidentally, where official Greek policy denies the existence of ethnic minorities, in Italy we find a rich array of minority cultural life, including some minority-language media. Greece's official line-often echoed in the media and in conversational conventions--emphasizes a transcendent homogeneity, whereas Italian politicians have little choice but to make their various forms of peace with cultural and regional diversity. One only has to think of the geographical fragmentation of Italian gastronomic exports and compare it with the more restricted roster of uncomplicatedly "Greek" goods in order to understand how deeply this contrast runs.
The marginality of the Italian national capital, with its massive and continuing production of local folklore scholarship (to which Athens has no corresponding corpus after the mid-nineteenth century) exemplifies a powerful dynamic of cultural hierarchy and hegemony. Among the extremes of internal orientalism that the Italian dynamic has produced (see Schneider, ed., 1998), northern stereotypes of Sicily, an island culturally not unlike Crete in its pattern of blood-feuds and "honor crimes," have provoked an especially powerful reaction. In the reactive localist ideology (sicilianismo), the institutions of socially sanctioned violence are recast in terms of autonomy, pride, and selfsufficiency (Schneider and Schneider 1994) . The groundwork for this ideological clash appeared early in the twentieth century, as local folklorists-most notably Giuseppe Pitr--romanticized the island's peasant culture in increas-ingly idealistic terms and so detached it from the sufferings that sprang from the no-less-deeply rooted social inequalities and associated violence (Cirese 1974:25) .
Here, the contrast with Greece is telling in a further respect. In Greece, the folklorists and historians mounted what I have called a defense of "cultural intimacy"-essentially concealing the core of familiar culture that would prove embarrassing on an international stage (Herzfeld 1997)-by proclaiming as national traditions the songs that celebrated those hardy guerrilla fighters (kleftes, literally "thieves") who had struggled against the Turks, allegedly for national independence but in practice more often for personal or at most local autonomy, and by conceptually detaching these guerrillas from the "bandits" of postindependence challenges (Herzfeld 1982:60-70) . In Italy, Sicilian romanticism became a means of defending island culture against mainland opprobrium, and the idea of mafia became a symbol of stalwart traditionalism that responded to Rome's threats of bureaucratic interference: the horizon of cultural intimacy was set at a local or regional rather than a national level. In Greece, the local brigands became national heroes instead; the only condition, and it was an inflexible one, was that they should henceforth cease and desist from their violent activities-a deal that Italian governments never achieved, and one that (if the anti-corruption prosecutors are to be believed) they never had any desire to achieve, so deeply and profitably implicated in its perpetuation were many of their leading figures.6
Strong cultural regionalism-not least in the form of insisting that Rome is in no way representative of the nation's culture-has a long history in Italy. In the middle of the nineteenth century, for example, the Jesuit Antonio Bresciani was claiming as Phoenician (and, by extension, Jewish) the peculiarities of Sardinian culture, while he also emphasized the unique features of Roman folk culture and attributed these to the powerful influence of Catholicism at its geographical and spiritual center-this, a scant nine years before Rome was wrested from papal control and, over the objections of several influential politicians of the day, made the national capital instead (see Cocchiara 1981a: 110-12). The willingness to embrace a Jewish pedigree for Sardinian local culture was perhaps not as ecumenical as it might seem, since Bresciani contrasted the Jewish mode of singing with that of Arabs, Kurds, and other oriental peoples, and suggests a political agenda of reinforcing the Catholic church's continuing dominance throughout Italy. What is more remarkable than the attempt to claim external origins for aspects of local or regional cultures, however, is the absence of any attempt to argue that the latter were realizations of a specifically national culture. Indeed, Bresciani defends the local specificity of Roman lore-again, it is worth emphasizing that this is the lore of the national capital-by emphasizing that every regional people (popolo) has its own ways of celebrating. One hardly discerns here the stuff of which nation-state ideology is usually made, with its attempts to claim jurisdiction over "the people" and its territory as the exclusive mandate of government located in a single, all-powerful capital city.
Other folklorists were meanwhile developing theories that emphasized the north-south divide, underscoring the northerners' cultural affinities with neighboring Romance-language traditions rather than with those of their fellowItalians to the south (see Cirese 1974:20-21; Cocchiara 1981b:337-38). This divisive perspective, moreover, which was grounded in assumptions about the racial basis of culture, perversely also invoked a survivalist assumption that northerners could no longer sustain traditional folklore. We thus see reproduced within Italy a pattern of cultural consciousness in which a relatively prosperous northern region lords it over a despised south, much as has been observed elsewhere in Europe (see, e.g., Fernandez 1983:166, for Spain) but that is notably absent in Greece.
These differences have important effects on the treatment of tradition in the various countries concerned. When Spanish southerners fight back, for example, it is by recreating a regional folklore (see Collier 1997:3-4) in ways that ironically echo and invert the assumption, so pervasive in Italy, that the southerners of that country are the bearers of tradition at its most genuine, and that consequently, when they cease to get it right, they are nothing at all. In Italy, moreover, unification-the most unequivocal expression of political modernism-has long been held to threaten the traditional individuality of the regions, and especially of the south; collecting folklore thus emerged as a means of institutionalizing the complicit hierarchy that Antonio Gramsci famously labeled hegemony (see, e.g., Femia 1981) . As a result, localism is trapped within the nation-state's claim to the modernist mantle of rationality; tradition and folklore are the marks of a difference that can only be rejected at the cost of losing the one feature in which peripheral regions can take pride, but that at the same time serve to debar their carriers from fully modem status.7 Scholarship was deeply implicated in these cultural politics. The great Sicilian philologist and folklorist Giuseppe Pitre, for example, despite his interest in cultural bor-7 This bitter paradox infests the academic discipline of folklore as much as it does its subjectmatter. See Abrahams 1993 for an interesting attempt to preserve a critical and reflexive folklore from the condescending implications of its name. His attempt to pit this novel reflexivity against the pervasive "essentialism of those who want to cling to the ideal of the folk community and the promise of wholeness and eternal return that live within such a perspective" (Abrahams 1993:31), while laudable for its refusal of the hegemonic implications of a nostalgic traditionalism (see also Herzfeld 2003), ultimately exposes above all the risk of essentialism entailed in his own and similar attempts to define a distinctive disciplinary space for folklore. See also Noyes 1999 for an amusing demonstration, germane to my present discussion, that folklore as a branch of study may ultimately be best understood as the local or regional intellectual voice that reclaims the authority to represent and describe tradition in the face of academic and bureaucratic impositions of modernist homogeneity.
rowings from both within and far beyond the borders of Italy, saw it as his fundamental task to preserve the individuality of Sicilian tradition against the encroachments of a homogenizing metropolitan and national culture (Cocchiara 1981b:357) . It is here, perhaps, that we see some convergence between the Greek and Italian situations, in that in both peripheral regions are associated with a traditionalism that serves to isolate them from the center's monopolistic grip on modernity.8
Bresciani's fear of paganism and his intense Catholicism placed the defense of church interests above all considerations of national solidarity. In practice, however, this religious motivation was not the driving force behind the emergent cultural fragmentation that characterized the new Italian nation-state in general. Even the most anticlerical elements were often no more enamored of the ideals of national unity than was the church; many Italians saw unity as nothing better than a Piedmontese version of admittedly more variegated foreign forms of domination in the various parts of the country before independence. In Greece, by contrast, Count Capodistrias (the first president of the country) seized the initiative by labeling locally powerful landowners who dared to resist the central authority of the state, notably the so-called "primates" of the Peloponnese (or Morea), as "Christian Turks" (Dakin 1973 Nor did they attack the official national church except in the sense that they were generically anticlerical. Cretan villagers, for example, characteristically chide priests for failing to live up to the principles of their religion; they do not attack the religion itself, although they often express the suspicion that its many restrictive rules were the priests' self-interested inventions. On the official side, the specifically religious critique of paganism was muted by state control of church interests, and especially by the creation of an archbishopric of Athens that was independent of the Patriarchate in Istanbul. To be sure, Greek church leaders viewed the early attempts at reconstituting the ancient roots of the modem state with serious misgivings; they were especially unhappy about the heavy emphasis placed on folkloric practices that, with the greater education that had led them to recognize pagan origins, they had in fact begun to expunge wherever they encountered them (see Stewart 1991:8-9). But religious opposition to the neo-Classical image of Hellenism did not come from the established church as much as from the moral authority of the Patriarchate, which had not initially supported the struggle for independence, because it had feared-rightly, as it turned out-that the church would be blamed by the Ottoman authorities.9 The national church, by contrast, was not going to expend much energy in criticizing the discursive survival strategies-essentially the claim on classical tradition and thus on the support of the European powers-of the very entity that, in the early decades of independence, was committed to preserving ecclesiastical authority as one of the pillars of the new national identity.
The classicizing strategies of early Italian folklorists did not have either the unifying intent or the homogenizing effects of their Greek counterparts (see Cocchiara 1981a:90, 109, etc.). They were eclectic, drawing on Etruscan and Greek as well as Roman prototypes. Similarly, the attempt to explain away the enormous cultural variety of Italy as the product of a transcendent national genius would largely have to await the arrival of the fascists and their heavy handed management of folklore exhibits (see, e.g., Bona 1940), although it was anticipated early in the twentieth century by a nostalgic folklore discourse through which "the 'myth' of the province constitutes an overcoming of the province" (Cocchiara 1981b :354); a few short years after World War II, in 1948, we again find the greater emphasis being placed on regional distinctiveness--not least, in respect of the local culture of Rome, the nation's capital, and even at the hands of an author writing partially in celebration of the centenary of unification (Toschi 1963 :108-9).
In Greece, the tendency to subordinate the local to the national set in early in folklore studies. This precocious unity was predicated on the projection of Athens as the moral, spiritual, and political center back onto an ancient world that certainly would not have been unanimous in according it such primacy. For theologians as much as for the populace at large, "the city" remained Constantinople/Istanbul, not Athens; but Athens, the national capital-and, as such, a secular, neo-Classical, and pragmatic convention-has remained effectively unchallenged. Despite the enthusiasm of its Catholic protagonists, Rome has never enjoyed such cultural authority over the country of which it is the administrative center; even among its own citizens there are those, still today, who would like to locate the capital elsewhere. In Greece, even local enthusiasts who can claim an archaeological heritage and a recorded history older than that of Athens generally phrase their claims as those of precursors of high (that is, Athenian) Hellenism rather than of a specifically local antiquity alone. Again, the apparent persistence of ancient ritual dating back at least to the sixth century B.C.E. among children's caroling customs on the island of Rhodes was sub-9 Moreover, the new state represented a Western-inspired and secular drive that threatened church authority. The criticisms have nevertheless shown a remarkable persistence within Greece, and have recently shown signs of permeating the major political parties despite the general tendency toward greater secularism; some theologians in Greece today even criticize the official national church, with its Athens bureaucracy and its rationalistic modus operandi, as-in a recognizably Weberian sense-"protestant" (Yannaras 1972; It is true that Cretans have long emphasized the "Doric" aspect of their ancestry, with (they maintain) its characteristic sense of gravity (see, e.g., Marandis 1973, a work completed in 1925). This, however, seems little more than a device for claiming a segment of the collective Hellenic past without in any sense challenging the political authority of Athens, which itself claimed partially Doric connections in ancient times. Rather, what we are seeing is the projection of a segmentary present onto the ancient past, which is then brought back in circular fashion to legitimate local pride within a national collectivity. It is a device that lives on, no doubt nurtured by dimly remembered schoolroom history, in everyday conversation, as when a proud Sfakian from southwest Crete claims that his Dorian ancestry endows him with a purer sense of warrior pride than that of the allegedly "Minoan" animal-thieves of Mount Ida further to the northeast (Herzfeld 1997:160-61)! Ideas like these, which occur repeatedly throughout the writings of folklorists, pervade the public imagination and inspire a mobilization that is at once nationalistic and localistic, and that feeds on the aggressive performance of stereotypical identities; it is no coincidence that, in Rethemnos,10 the most vociferous advocate of organizing a battalion of volunteers to fight for the Greek cause in Macedonia, a tall, elderly man with bristling white whiskers and a stooped carriage but dramatically measured step, always dressed ostentatiously in a Sfakian costume with high white boots and a black knitted turban. There is a tight logical convergence between these admittedly rather extreme expressions of patriotic sentiment and the structure of ideas that informs the collecting and publishing activities of folklorists. Within Greece, so the local Cretan folklorists have often argued, the national ideal reaches its apogee: "In our Crete things are still more beautiful.... Our grandfathers ... passed on from generation to generation the diamantine wealth of Greek traditions that became the unquenchable hearth that held in its core the flame of our National traditions and the proof of our continuous descent from our glorious Ancient ancestors" lected local folklore in the national cause were local teachers and who published locally so that they, too, "could add a small stone to the great work of our Folklorists" (Oustayannaki-Takhataki 1976:9). Teachers throughout Greece have served as a conduit for the flow of ideas between local communities and official and academic discourse, and the process has not developed in only one direction.
Teachers were important early collectors of folklore throughout Europe during and beyond the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of ethnographic vignette and folklorists' texts that I have just presented suitably introduces what makes the Greek case so different from the Italian. Italy at unification had thrown off the control of a varied grab-bag of powers; it faced no serious risk of overall reconquest by these or other neighboring states, whatever tensions may have continued to subsist in specific border zones. Its prehistoric, medieval, and Renaissance histories emphasized local autonomy and internal cultural difference, as well as a continuing engagement with, and participation in, the "high culture" of Western Europe. For Greece, a much smaller country faced with the single but real danger of reabsorption into the Ottoman Empire and despised as a mere relic of its glorious past now deeply tarnished by the years of Ottoman rule (see St. Clair 1972:18-19), cultural homogeneity was a crucial goal of national consolidation. Folklore studies played a remarkably consistent and active part in sustaining that goal. While local teachers and others were encouraged to gather folkloric materials and preserve the traditions of every region or district, as employees of the state they were expected to do so in ways that reinforced national unity. Localism was an affirmation of national unity, not a challenge to it. While occasional separatist mutterings have been heard in Crete and the Dodecanese, they have been rare and short-lived exceptions to a strikingly consistent pattern of a passionate national solidarity that in practice often far exceeds what one ordinarily encounters nearer the capital itself.
THE CRETAN CASE: PATRIOTIC LOCALISM
The usefully extreme example of Crete-one of the more recent additions to the Greek national territory (1913)-dramatically suggests that three factors converged to invest the project of national unity with imperative urgency at the Rather than seeing this as plagiarism, I suspect that its logic was so self-evident to local Cretan writers that the passage in question must have seemed proverbial and public rather than the product of a particular author's pen. It thus transpires that Greek nationalism must fight on two fronts simultaneously. These two fronts-stereotypically those of the fanatically Islamic East and the secularist-humanist West, a binarism that continues to have tragic currency in world affairs today and in which Greek political discourse is heavily implicated-effectively collude in the humiliation that Greeks experience; for Western powers have often used the presence of the East (or of some hypothetical Balkan atavism) in Greek culture as an excuse for not treating Greece as a full partner either culturally or politically. Indeed, the dynamics of this double and curiously consistent threat has preserved and generated an emphasis on cultural unity in the face of undeniable cultural diversity and of equally undeniable political factionalism.
The peculiar circumstances of Greek nation-state formation, with an internally segmentary understanding of social and cultural relations, has thus, for the entirety of post-Independence Greek history, been subjected to constant external pressure both from an allegedly expansionist Turkey to the east (and by other potentially invasive countries to the north) and a culturally and economically tutelary West. Indeed, these two pressures form twin aspects of the same problem for the Greeks: held to a standard of "Western" or "European" culture, of which they are cruelly regarded as at once the primeval ancestors and the inept modern imitators, they can afford neither to tolerate internal separatism (itself allegedly a sign of "non-Western" fractiousness) nor to concede any contributory influence to the Turks, Albanians, or Slavs (which, in the language of the West's ability to reconfigure geography to suit its cultural prejudices, would be taken as evidence of "non-European" identity). Unlike the Italians, whose claims to be part of European cultural and political history are grounded in the Renaissance rather than in Classical antiquity, and whose own occupiers since medieval times were virtually all European powers themselves, the Greeks have always had to defend their cultural identity against the crudest forms of orientalism (in Said's [1978] sense) .
The Greek elite, privy through education to some at least of the trappings of occidental cultural identity, then used the same judgmental stick to beat the provincial peasantry. One effect of this process has been the removal, in the name of a doubtless perfectly sincere respect for local forms but also surely motivated by a desire to maintain the distance between elite and rural laity, of linguistically archaic and formal elements, not only from older manuscripts of folk verse, but also in at least one instance (Tsouderos 1993:8) , from the published poetic offerings of contemporary Cretan versifiers-an inversion of the earlier tendency to "cleanse" all local texts of dialectal idioms in order to lend them panhellenic respectability (see Kondilakis 1987 Kondilakis [1919 :140-41). The effect of such moves was to disenfranchise local discourse even while localist discourse-the rhetoric of a more formally educated segment of the populationsought legitimacy at the national level.
As a result, there virtually never emerged an intellectual representation of peasant values such as might have challenged the hegemony of the state. The elite had as profound an interest in maintaining existing inequalities as did the foreign powers. As a result, what in Italy has become the material basis of centrifugal cultural claims worked in the opposite direction in Greece: the very threat of being exposed as more Turkish than Greek was sufficient embarrassment to keep the provinces in line, and the very relativity of cultural identity within Greece fed the insecurity that still fuels the rhetoric of infrangible unity-a rhetoric, grounded in claims to a common heritage in the ancient past, that seeks to placate a critical international audience. Thus the more outlandish-conceptually and geographically--a provincial culture was seen to be, the more energetically it could be forced to vie for the mantle of Hellenic perfection, and the less easily it could proclaim any form of cultural independence from the metropolitan center. Crete approximates a fairly extreme point on this scale of marginality.
Perhaps the clearest evidence of their predicament is the extent to which the Cretans engage in special pleading by arguing that, loyal as they are to the national cause, they are the best and perhaps the only Greeks whose traditions of bellicose heroism could save the entire country from its external enemies. These are claims often heard in everyday discourse. Indeed, in the last decade of the twentieth century, the formation of a volunteer battalion of Cretans to fight in defense of Macedonia if called upon and the dispatch of humanitarian aid to the "Serbian brethren" (i.e., Orthodox coreligionists) of Bosnia underscore this last aspect, and suggests ways in which fierce agnatic clan ideology and the sustenance of a belief in "hereditary enemies" (i.e., the Turks, here an inclusive term for Balkan Muslims of all varieties) can coalesce in a united front surprising only because Cretans are, by their own stereotypical admission, highly prone to factionalism, localism, and the pursuit of personal and familial interests.12
There have been spasms of separatism on Crete from time to time, and the general view seems to be that Athens is an ungrateful tyrant and morally not better than the Ottoman Sultanate. Even these sentiments, however, arguably have more to do with claims that the Cretans are the best Greeks of all than with any desire, such as has manifested itself in Cyprus, to dissociate the island politically or culturally from the highly centralized system of the Greek nationstate. Thus, Cretans are always more wary of the center than of any other part of the country, for it is to the center that the case for cultural and patriotic superiority must always be made. This bias has unambiguous effects on the practices of popular folklore scholarship. itics-always to some degree dependent, especially during the early years of consolidation, on securing the active approval of the populace in the task of nation-building. It is certainly not my intention to suggest that the folklorists in question were major trend-setters. On the contrary, their rather humbler role may have been much more important than that. They were largely followers of the dominant ideology and, as such, were crucial cogs in the articulation of local sentiment with the discourse of national redemption. By treating their discursive practices as a set of conventions (while recognizing some degree of internal elasticity and negotiability), we can identify the principal presuppositions that informed their methods. It becomes clear that they were an important catalyst in the mutual recognition between an educated and often arrogant elite on the one hand, and a largely powerless peasantry on the other, that was so necessary to the success of the integrative project of nationhood.
OF LOVE AND WAR
Let us then first turn to a short piece written by a philologist, himself (as his surname shows) connected by patrilineal kinship to one of the more peaceable villages of the generally bellicose Upper Milopotamos district. This fluent narrative incorporates a scheme of collective, cultural self-justification that underscores the reasons why folklore data were collected and classified in specific ways.
The Abduction of Persephone (A Wedding on Crete) (Dafermos 1951 ) is an account of how a young woman was abducted by a relatively poor suitor. Such events are far from uncommon even today, and, in that they are often contests between patrilinea groups as much as between prospective son-and father-inlaw, they reproduce many of the symbolic features that one can also discern in other arenas of masculine self-display in the mountain communities (Herzfeld 1985a:52; 1985b). It is not clear whether the name of the heroine given in title and text, Persephone, was her real one, or whether the writer introduces it to sound the appropriate Classical parallel; indeed, the two possibilities are not mutually exclusive.
The only aspect that seems somewhat unusual about this document is that it records, in print, a type of activity over which Upper Milopotamites profess great embarrassment before the wider world. Given the likely origins of the author, however, it seems likely that his intended audience was not a foreign one so much as the supercilious elite to which he, as an educated man, could claim admission. This is confirmed by a key passage (Dafermos 1951 Thanks to this revealing instance of internal segmentation, we can see more clearly than would otherwise be possible how the internal bellicosity of a clandivided population could gradually be absorbed by the rhetoric of national unity. Moreover, the description of the village girding up for the pursuit of the abductor and his potentially dishonored prey-the consequences of his refusing to marry her would have been a cry for total and final vengeance on the abductor and perhaps for the young woman's execution as well (see also Campbell 1964:172)--directly invokes the national and statist parallel: "Knives and pistols were slipped out of their storage cases. War had been declared before the diplomats had withdrawn, as we say ..
. Total war, as military language would have it" (Dafermos 1951:2).
The narrative is divided into two parts. The first is an account of the abduction and its aftermath, and it is here that the rhetoric of collective selfjustification occurs. In the second half, the author explicitly explains his decision to describe the wedding itself as an attempt to lend weight to his theme of unity out of disunity. This theme does not only reproduce a common aspect of rural Greek social relations (see Campbell 1964:125); it also matches a peculiarly local set of practices-including that of formal reconciliation, which he also mentions (Dafermos 1951 (Dafermos 1951:16) . In the context of linguistic and ethnic purism, such total absolution of the wicked abductor (kleftis, literally "thief") encompasses also that of the entire nation whose national revolution was spearheaded by guerrillas themselves subsequently and categorically canonized as kleftes (again, literally, "thieves"). In this way, folkloristic writing serves the cause of dispelling cultural embarrassment at the level of community, region, and nation.13
The example I have just examined shows how sensitive Greek writers can be to any imputation that their rural compatriots might be less than European or "civilized," and how tightly they calibrate such judgments to statist and West European values. Once again, the contrasted example of Italy is instructive. In the absence of political considerations that demanded national self-abasement as the price of even nominal independence, Italian folklorists could not invoke the specter of Western disapproval-so strikingly parallel, in the Greek case, with the usual local-level attention to appearances (e.g., du Boulay 1974:201-13; Friedl 1962:83)-in order to marshal local support for the project of national cultural integration. While Italians certainly express stereotypical anguish about the "Africanness" of the south, and while Romans in particular often seem to cast themselves in rueful opposition to an idealized "Europe" much as do Greeks in general, these are discourses about largely internal dynamics. Greek politicians worry much more about external appearances, which they view as crucial to maintaining the legal integrity of the national territory: this is why successive Greek governments have systematically denied Macedonian and Turkish minority demands for self-determination, arguing that these moves might legitimate territorial claims by aggressive neighbors. Here, paradoxically, Western (and global) disapproval counts for much less, and occasions more resentment than fear, as does the apparent inability or reluctance of Western Europeans-Italians prominently included-to understand why the Greeks appear to be so fiercely nationalistic.
Rome's agenda was never that of Athens. Rome was not answerable to a tutelary West bent on casting it in the role of heroic ancestor fallen on dispiriting- ly grubby times. While Romans know that their fellow Italians deride their supposedly uncouth ways, they largely rejoice in the paradoxical marginality of a city that also has claims to be the center of the (Western) world, and also seem confident of keeping the cultural respect of the rest of Europe.14 From the start, Athens far more desperately needed its folklorists' efforts to create bridges with high antiquity, in order to garner the West's grudging, often ungenerous, and usually tardy support. Ironically, then, as I have just indicated, it seems to have been precisely this bullying overlordship that gave Greece the unity that Italy lacks. It is also this sense of an external enemy (or at least critic) who must be placated at all costs-not the stereotypically evil East but the hypocritically moralistic West-that allows Athens both to treat the provinces with the same kind of disdain as it experiences from the other Western capitals, and, at the same time, to expect from those same provinces a high degree of categorical loyalty despite the widely acknowledged existence of an almost equally high degree of situation-specific subversion. No part of Greece reproduces both aspects of this dual dilemma in quite such an extreme form as Crete, which both marshals volunteer forces for a potential war over Macedonia and yet continues-admittedly with unofficial but highly placed political support1"-to entertain such dramatically anti-statist activities as the stockpiling of weapons, animaltheft, and the pursuit of clan vendettas. . That is to say, with dance they wanted to bring woman closer to man through dance, through merrymaking." But there is a danger in giving in too easily to the lure of love and the fatal attractions of women, in the ideology of this powerfully androcentric culture. While the organization of the sirtos, in which (so Romanias claims) the groom and bride, the matchmaker, and the fathers of the newlyweds danced in a row, is read here as a translation of the warlike pendozalis into the (social) expression of love, it is for this reason, we are told, that the often pro-Turkish large landowners wanted to make the sirtos the national dance of Crete, in the hope that the Cretan people would forget the struggles which it had carried out against the Turks-and against suspected collaborators--for its freedom (Romanias 1965:70) . The fundamental importance of reproduction notwithstanding, war was the encompassing translation of local identity into national sentiment. To that sentiment, ordinary people suspected the big landowners-who had been predominantly Turks (that is, Muslims) until the end of the nineteenth century, and whose Christian successors are still regarded as no less rapacious-of being faithful only when it suited them. When Capodistrias accused the Peloponnesian landowners of being "Christian Turks," he was voicing a widespread attitude that lingers to this day on Crete, the one part of Greece that also still maintains the patrilineal kinship ideology and the practices of reciprocal animal-theft that appear to have informed the social lives of the heroic guerrillas of the struggle for independence.
Indeed, the warlike aspect of Cretan culture occupies a focal position in most local writing on Cretan folklore. War offers this discourse both opportunities and risks, for it is here that the violence of patriotism and the violence of in- 16 On entextualization, see the collection by Silverstein and Urban, eds., 1996, and, for a discussion of particular relevance to the uses of folklore, Raheja 1996. 17 Greek distinguishes between aghapi (affective love; cf. New Testament agape) and erotas (sexual love). Since aghapi seems to be the basis of elopements, and since the language in which it is celebrated is often highly physical, it is not clear that the distinction is as clear-cut as the Classical Greek contrast between agape and er-os might lead one to expect. subordination and subversion come most obviously into juxtaposition and the potential for conflict between two different kinds of loyalty becomes most obvious. Against whom do Cretan mountain villagers bear arms-each other, the state, or the enemy outside? Otherness, it transpires, is always relative to the situation. The songs, narrative poems, and even love distichs are full of references to collective violence in various forms. To admit that such violence is directed both against the officers of the state and, more particularly, in defiance of their attempts at control, would go against the grain of most folklorists' ideological convictions. To see it both as the product of long-term oppression by the hated Turks and as the most valued ingredient of the national fight against them, on the other hand, resolves the potential dilemma in a most efficient manner. It is the Turks'fault that Cretans must resort to such disreputable and "unEuropean" wildness, whereas it is the Cretans' virtue to have deployed it in the national cause. This is the clear corollary of the Cretan villagers' own frequently expressed view that the politicians in Athens are virtual Turks themselves, and that it is up to the pure-minded and warlike Cretans to bail them out of the consequences of their effete corruption while continuing to exploit the venalityespecially in the delicately negotiated trading of votes for protection from the consequences of illegal actions-that this corruption sustains.
What we are confronting here, as I have remarked elsewhere (Herzfeld 1987:154-57), is a pattern of segmentary relations, in which the regional subunits of the nation-state reproduce in their relations with the center the latter's relationship with the external powers on which it depends. Moreover, there is a remarkable convergence between the German-derived positivism that undergirds Greek legal practices on the one hand (see especially Pollis 1992), and popular morality on the other, in their shared focus on categorical ascription rather than specifically individual rights and obligations: identity is never admitted to be a matter of choice. This curious but powerful convergence contributes to the Greeks' amazement that the world seems unable to understand why they do not wish to countenance ethnic minorities within their borders, despite the prevalence of a highly relativistic way of dealing with social relations. Categorical terms carry specific moral charges. Thus, while it is perfectly possible to be a dhikos/-i mas (insider, therefore trustworthy) as a co-villager and a ksenos/-i (outsider, therefore an object of suspicion) as a non-kinsperson at the same time, it is inconceivable that one should be both a Turk (categorically defined as the member of another national entity) and trustworthy (i.e., unTurkish) at the same time, and this exclusionary perception is in perfect harmony with the legal insistence that minorities are defined by their institutional (rather than self-ascriptive) status. In this reading, in which statist discourse perfectly matches the values of a markedly antistatist people, one cannot have a religion without a church, and one cannot have an ethnic identity (ethniki taftotita) without being in some sense a member of a non-Greek nation (ethnos) as defined by its own statehood-and so being always potentially an enemy. Thus, collective experience colludes with official discourse to provide an especially profound sensitivity over any external threat to the idea of Greek cultural unity, the diachronic expression and validation of which lies in Greek claims to direct links with classical antiquity. To this day, relatively unlettered Cretan villagers will often talk about whether particular words are "Greek" or not, so effectively has that ideological premise penetrated the popular imagination. There are even songs that, presumably under the influence of local teachers, recall an ancient past that less than a century and a half earlier had been unknown to most peasants (e.g., Romanias 1965 . Thus claims to the Classical past have given distinctive coloration to a conceptual system in which center and periphery both accept a tense but infrangible symbiosis. The phenomenon of proghonopliksia ("being ancestor-struck"), a recurrent plaint in Greek social criticism and conventional wisdom alike, palpably overdetermines Greek national self-perceptions, but in a manner that supports that symbiosis rather than feeding the impetus of separatism.
HISTORY THROUGH CATEGORIES
These apparent contradictions are especially evident in virtually all discourse that deals with the unavoidable evidence of strong Turkish influence on Greek culture. The distinction between genetic descent and cultural heritage is one that has little place in official discourse-social anthropology is a relatively novel discipline in Greece' "-and as a result, coming to terms with the clear marks of Turkishness at the local level provokes certain conceptual moves that reveal the logic of this symbiosis. By way of an introductory comment, let me remark that it is often those same people who decry the apparently greater degree of Turkishness in outlying areas of the Greek-speaking world (Crete, Cyprus, the Pontus) who also make the most romantic claims about the purity of their Hellenic heritage and the directness of their descent from even pre-classical Greeks. Such attitudes represent the extreme cultural expression of power over the outlying rural populations. It is important in the present context to bear in mind that this in itself partly disposes of the sense of paradox described here. It is the ability of the center to monopolize the terms of national self-definition that also 18 Social anthropology only began as a university discipline in Greece with the founding conference of the appropriate department of the University of the Aegean, Mytilene, in 1986. More recently, the Pandio University of Social and Political Sciences in Athens has begun a program. Both are expanding rapidly and the subject seems to be highly popular with students interested in the social sciences. allows it, in effect to provoke the periphery into an exact replication of the center's defensive adoption of "European" identity. The center decides what is really Greek and dismisses as corrupt but also as quaintly belonging to another age (see Danforth 1984; Fabian 1983 ) every attempt that the periphery makes to claim a pure Classical heritage. This institutionalized condescension has as one result the defensive local production of national virtue and national history.
Two examples will illustrate the point clearly. First, Cretan children learn in school that the characteristic black Cretan male headdress (saric'i or bolidha) owes its color to the Cretans' mourning for their domination by the Turks. The evidence for this is at best questionable, especially given the existence of similar kinds of headgear in other cultures of the region, and the use of black may well have arisen from the puritanical nineteenth-century movements that also dulled the brilliant colors of female finery-a form of dress, incidentally, that has been brought back into use as an official folklore idiom.
The other example is especially illustrative for our present purposes. Children are taught that the characteristic Cretan surname ending in -akis (e.g., Theodorakis, Hadjidakis), which is the masculine form of the standard Greek diminutive ending -aki (neuter), was imposed on the Greeks by the Turks as a collective humiliation. This is why, in the Upper Milopotamos region, so few surnames have the ending; the area was allegedly never fully conquered by the Turks. If this were a valid explanation, however, it would be difficult to explain the prevalence of such names both among Turkish-Cretans (names like Kounelakis are found still among families of Turkish-Cretan origin in the Dodecanese) and in Sfakia, the other region where the Turks supposedly never gained an effective foothold. (In fact, both of the supposedly "free" zones seem to have been under fairly direct Turkish control for most of the period of Turkish rule; see Damer 1988) .
What is odd here is that a far more plausible explanation is readily available to the Cretans from their everyday experience. This is the common practice, when a new surname is created out of a nickname (as often occurs especially in the pastoral communities), of adding the -akis suffix to the surname for the bearer's sons to create terms of both address and reference. This usage, which carries the approximate meaning of "young X," is exactly parallel to that of -poulos suffix in the Peloponnese (a region that, like Crete, though less so in the present, was once marked by a strong emphasis on agnatic kinship as the basis of association). It is also extremely common. When I first realized that this was an everyday usage that everyone seemed perfectly able to understand in these terms, I was very puzzled by the Cretans' insistence on the "official" explanation. That puzzlement disappears, however, once one realizes that the Cretans have thereby translated a standard idiom of social ascription into the patriotic expression of adhesion to a national history of suffering under the Turks. This device is especially appropriate in that the "Race" (fili or ratsa) of all persons of Greek descent is usually conceptualized in agnatic terms: descent in the male line is what guarantees national identity. This is a striking example of the phenomenon mentioned above, whereby the emphasis on various kinds of categorical ascription at the local level fits perfectly with the logic of Greek legal and political discourse. It illustrates with particular clarity the translation of segmentary thinking between a local level where it is still closely tied to a particular (unilineal) mode of kinship reckoning to a national one where the only permissible expression of disunity lies in vying with other regions for the mantle of patriotic valor and ethnic purity-a contest orchestrated from the Athenian center.
One aspect of this categorical process is the disappearance of the concept of "Greek Muslims" as a possible option. While all Cretan Muslims were known in Greek as Tourki in the nineteenth century, the term "Turk" was not a national or ethnic term in Turkey itself until after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It is thus an irony of history that it was to be the newly secularizing Turkish state to which most "Turkish-Cretans," most of whom were speakers of various Cretan dialects of Greek, found themselves displaced, for it was their religion that got them there. The few so-called Muslims who succeeded in remaining on Crete did so through baptism or through marriage to Christians, a circumstance that unequivocally highlights the substantively religious basis of this identity and reveals religious affiliation (that word is peculiarly apt here!) as a sort of higher-order or fictive patriliny. These complexities of the definition of "Turk" in the Cretan context also have important echoes in the collection and classification of folklore.
TEXTS OF COMMUNITY AND DIFFERENCE
The lack of fit between the actual development of Turkish-Cretan identity and the achronic categories of official discourse leaves a strong mark on the scholarly treatment of folklore. Moreover, the common cultural framework was not solely linguistic. The mandinadha idiom was certainly found in both confessional communities; in Ayvahk, I heard several mandinadhes from a Muslim woman who described herself as being from Khania (one of the major cities of Crete) although she herself had been born in Turkey. I mention these facts in order to underscore the close symbolic association often made between this verse-and-song genre and Cretan identity, and its persistence among even the uprooted "Turkish-Cretans" of today.
This evidence of a common heritage is handled in very gingerly fashion even by quite recent scholars. Thus, Theokharis Detorakis, in publishing a long-forgotten manuscript of folklore materials assembled by the important nineteenthcentury Cretan novelist Yannis Kondilakis, marks off three of the mandinadhes in the collection as 487 Cretan mandinadhes, distinguishing between the majority as "genuinely Cretan" and the small set of three as "Turkish-Cretan" (Kondilakis 1987 (Kondilakis [1919 :14). The implications of this brief notation are enormous. When one examines the three texts in question (Kondilakis 1987 (Kondilakis [1919 :56), which are placed in a separate space from the others, one does indeed see that they all contain references to Turkish names or Islamic terminology. But does Turkish terminology, especially in this linguistically hellenized form, necessarily mean that the singer was a Turk or even an islamized Greek? In 1967, I heard what I believe to be a common enough distich in a village of the Khania prefecture, in which the apostrophe nouri mou ("my light")-a term of Arabic derivation-served as an endearment offered to the listener. Of course any allusion to Rabi, a term of address for Allah, implies a Muslim singer; but the stark separation of so-called "Turkish-Cretan" texts suggests a greater degree of cultural separation in the minds of modern editors than was perhaps experienced by Kondilakis, in whose time the cultural relationships between the two confessional communities were not always hostile and entailed an enormous amount of mutual visiting, shared feasting, and amicable greeting-a circumstance that the oldest refugees in Ayvallk still recalled. Indeed, it was the mandinadha that especially confirmed the common ground between two religious groups separated not only by their beliefs and ritual practices but also by a powerfully differentiated relationship to the locus of political authority under Ottoman rule.
It is important to remember in this context that wherever Muslims and Christians shared the Greek language they were apt to share also the expressive devices that gave form to their social and historical experiences. Although we do not have comparable data from Crete, we do know, for example, that the laments for the fall of a citadel were shared by the Muslims and Christians of the Peloponnese, so that-no matter who was the aggressor and who the victim-the framework of collective tragedy appears to be remarkably constant given the alleged mutual hostility of the two groups (see Herzfeld 1982:63; see textual materials in Passow 1860). The point of the mandinadha is precisely that it provides both a common framework and, ipso facto, a basis for the expression of difference. This is what makes it an ideal vehicle for verbal dueling: "matching" or "coupling" (verb teriazo) such mandinadhes is an art which, appropriately in a society where verbal skills are viewed as a mark of aggressive masculinity, implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) parallels verbal wit with sexual contest. Perhaps inadvertently, the folklorists' taxonomic habits reproduce this logic of difference within a shared idiom. Thus, their practice of presenting "Turkish-Cretan" mandinadhes as examples of the genre, but as differentiated from those that are judged to be "genuinely Cretan," does in the realm of expressive genres what the rereading of the -akis surname suffix does in the realm of social relations: it recasts a recognizably local and non-ethnic idiom in the terms of the Eurocentric nation-state. This observation takes us beyond the usual pieties about the importance of looking at folklore genres in their performative context, for it shows us that academic entextualization is itself a kind of performance, one that makes far better sense when it is lined up for direct comparison with the local comparisons it has been designed to engulf. What is more, the suppression of social and performative context is itself a common academic and nationalistic strategy. It has allowed editors, then and now, to present as categorical and exclusionary a social and religious division that also served at feasts, at which Muslims and Christians once apparently exchanged these poetic compliments and insults, as a basis of communication. It takes the socially relative and renders it culturally absolute.
The rejection of the Turks as "genuine" Cretans illustrates the extent to which Cretan folklore studies have been cast in terms of national categories and ideology. Symbolic representations of descent (usually by "blood" and in a patrilineal idiom) are still often, and dangerously, conflated with religious categories, with the result that non-Orthodox affiliation can lead to official doubts about the genuineness of one's Greek ancestry (Eleftherotipia 1993 ). The Orthodox church has mounted a sustained and effective resistance to the removal of religion as a compulsory category of identity on national identity cards. Once again we see how Greek cultural classification represents a convenient match between legal and popular categories. The niceties of technical distinctions between "Turk" and "Muslim" are as irrelevant to the concerns of most Greeks as is the distinction between cultural and genetic heritage. As long as the Turks remain the definitive enemy, such conflation of blood and belief continues to reinforce pan-Orthodox sentiments favoring the Serbs in the Bosnian conflict as much as anti-Muslim attitudes at home. The success of the official discourse in exploiting local-level ideas about social and cultural identity is another important factor in the ultimately centripetal direction of localist sentiment. We should not be too surprised at this. The principles of legal positivism, while claiming objective status, appear to be grounded in a symbolic value system that was probably of enormous antiquity in Europe and beyond long before the invention of the nation-state as we know it today. The conflation of intellectual rationality and popular common sense produces a powerful device for suppressing dissension in the matter of ethnic and local identity. That it is nonetheless ultimately a symbolic system, rather than the product of some culture-free rationality, should be clear from the extent to which the folklorists sought to bring all their materials into line with the taxonomy, rather than the other way around. When we study academic classifica-tion in the same terms as we would examine folk classification-when, indeed, we treat the scholars as "folk" in their own right-we take their claims of cultural membership seriously by challenging their claims of intellectual hegemony over, and separation from, the people they so condescendingly call "simple." At that point, it becomes clear that the underlying assumptions of the folklore they have studied also guide their own reactions to the national and international crises of their time. The local-level mode of segmentary feuding on Crete translates with remarkable ease into the nesting of local pride within the production of an externally unified and culturally homogeneous patriotism. In these circumstances, there is no practical contradiction between that patriotism and the most aggressive pride in the local culture of Crete.
